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WATER MARKETING AS AN ADAPTIVE RESPONSE  
TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Jonathan H. Adler* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Water is essential for human civilization.1 It can be a wellspring for 
prosperity and a source of conflict.2 For the United States and many other 
nations, ensuring access to quality water supplies is among the most pressing 
environmental policy challenges of the twenty-first century – and it is a 
challenge that water institutions are failing to meet.3 Water use already 
exceeds the carrying capacity of natural systems in many places and 
continues to increase.4 Demographic changes and existing water use patterns 
have placed tremendous pressures upon water supplies, particularly in the 
West. In 2003, a majority of states anticipated water shortages over the 
subsequent decade, even in the absence of drought conditions.5 Water policy 
experts contend, without exaggeration, that “the United States is heading 
toward a water scarcity crisis.”6 
 Global climate change will exacerbate pressures on water resources.7 
Although news reports devote more space to the potential threat of rising 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. The author would like to thank Andrew Morriss 
and Roger Meiners for their comments and Tai Antoine for her research assistance. All errors 
or omissions remain those of the author.  
1  See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Water Marketing in Western Prior Appropriation 
States: A Model for the East, 21 GA. ST. U L. REV. 429, 431 (2004) (“On the scale of basic 
biological needs, water no doubt ranks higher than electricity.”). 
2  Control over water supplies is a consistent source of friction between states. 
See, e.g., Greg Bluestein, Drought Has Georgia Revisiting Border Dispute, WASH. POST, Feb. 
10, 2008, at A9, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2008/02/09/AR2008020902283.html (describing boundary and water dispute between 
Georgia and Tennessee). 
3  The World Health Organization reports four out of ten people worldwide are 
already impacted by water scarcity. See World Health Organization, 10 Facts About Water 
Scarcity, Mar. 20, 2007, available at http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/water/en/ 
index.html. 
4  TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE 
INVISIBLE PUMP 1 (1997) (stating “our water use is depleting and exceeding the limits of 
natural systems in many parts of the world”). 
5  G. Tracy Mehan, III, Energy, Climate Change, and Sustainable Water 
Management, DAILY ENVT. REP., Dec. 4, 2007, at 4.  
6  Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1873, 1873 (2005). According to Glennon, “our current water use practices are unsustainable, 
and environmental factors threaten a water supply heavily burdened by increased demand.” Id. 
7  Kathleen A. Miller, Steven L. Rhodes, & Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Water 
Allocation in a Changing Climate: Institutions and Adaptation, 35 CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 
157 (1997) (stating “global warming may have profound impacts on water resource 
availability”). 
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sea-levels, for many places “diminished supplies of fresh water may prove a 
far more serious problem.”8 For the United States in particular, the climatic 
effect on water is significantly more ominous than that on coastline. Some 
water officials go so far as to liken the impact of a dramatic decline in water 
resources to “Armageddon.”9 
Whereas there has been substantial research on the potential effect of 
climate change upon water resources, there has been relatively little 
consideration of the role of institutional arrangements in mitigating (or 
exacerbating) the potential effects of warming-induced changes in water 
supplies.10 Climate change increases the urgency with which water managers 
and policymakers must address water supply concerns, moving toward water 
supply institutions and policies that are sufficiently flexible, adaptive, and 
robust to deal with the uncertain water future. As the IPCC has concluded, 
“changes in water management practices will have a very significant impact 
on how climate change affects the water sector.”11 There is “great and 
arguably unavoidable” uncertainty with regard to future climate change and 
other potential impact on water supplies, including changes in population and 
relevant technologies.12 More efficient water distribution and allocation 
institutions are necessary. The inefficiencies inherent in existing water 
institutions are a luxury we can no longer afford. 
 This article argues that climate change, and its projected effects on 
water use and supply, calls for a fundamental reexamination of water 
institutions. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel On Climate 
Change (IPCC) has noted that there are numerous policy options that “would 
generate net social benefits regardless of whether there was a climate 
change.”13 Examples of such “no regrets” policies would include the 
elimination of irrigation and development subsidies that artificially increase 
water demand, as well as the incorporation of environmental values into 
existing water institutions.14 This article suggests that the gradual 
                                                 
8  Jon Gertner, The Future Is Drying Up, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 21, 2007, 
available at 2007 WLNR 20645374. 
9  Id. 
10  Miller, Rhodes & MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 157 (Researchers “have given 
less attention to the role of institutional factors in determining the efficacy of alternative 
response strategies.”). 
11  CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY – 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 197 (James J. McCarthy, et al. eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII]. 
12  Stacy K. Tanaka, et al., Climate Warming and Water Management Adaptation 
for California, 76 CLIMATIC CHANGE 361, 367 (2006); see also Miller, Rhodes & 
MacDonnell, supra note 7 at 159 (“we must now accommodate competing water demands 
within the context of increasing hydrologic uncertainty.”). 
13  CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 219-21. 
14  Id. at 221. 
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implementation of water markets is also such a “no regrets” policy.15 Many 
aspects of water markets, including their flexibility, decentralized nature, and 
ability to create and harness economic incentives, make them particularly 
well suited to address the uncertain water forecast. A gradual shift toward 
water marketing and market pricing will improve the management of water 
supplies, ensure more efficient allocation of available water supplies, and 
encourage cost-effective conservation measures. 
 Part II of this article provides a brief overview of current climate 
change projections and their expected impact on water supplies and use 
patterns. That climate change will have an effect on water availability is 
quite certain. Yet, the precise outcome of such effects is uncertain. Indeed, 
the ultimate effect of climate change on water resources is essentially 
unpredictable. This uncertainty increases the need for water institutions that 
are flexible and capable of responding to unanticipated changes in water 
supplies and demands. 
 Part III explains why water markets are an appropriate institutional 
response to the particular challenges posed by climate change. Water markets 
have substantial benefits over traditional, centralized planning and 
administration, including their flexibility and utilization of decentralized 
information. Market-based pricing of water provides additional benefits, 
including the creation of incentives for increased efficiency and 
conservation. In short, there is a particularly good match between the 
primary virtues of water markets and the demands placed on water 
institutions by the prospect of climate change.  
 Part IV of the article offers some preliminary thoughts on how to 
manage the transition to market institutions for water. Like all institutional 
arrangements, water markets are not perfect. Further, there are political and 
administrative obstacles that could impede a move toward greater reliance on 
markets for the allocation and pricing of water. Nonetheless, as this section 
discusses, water markets have been used to manage water quite effectively in 
many parts of the world, and could help mitigate the negative impact of 
global climate change on water supplies. 
 
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE THREAT OF WATER 
SCARCITY 
 
Extensive scientific research suggests human activity is having a 
demonstrable effect on the global climate system.16 The anthropogenic 
                                                 
15  The IPCC has also noted the potential value of water markets and tradeable 
water rights in addressing climate change-induced water scarcity. See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY – CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO 
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
191-92 (Martin Parry, et al., eds. 2007) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII]. 
16  See William Collins, et al., The Physical Science Behind Climate Change, SCI. 
AMER. 68 (Aug. 2007) (noting that the 2007 IPCC report concluded it was “very likely” that 
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emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is contributing to a 
gradual, but increasingly perceptible, increase in global mean temperatures 
that is expected to continue over the next century.17 The precise nature and 
degree of the human contribution is unknown, and may even be unknowable 
given the complexity of the global climate system. Nonetheless, even if there 
was a sizable chance that human activity is having little impact in 
comparison to natural fluctuations, the probability of a significant human 
impact on the climate system is more than sufficient to warrant 
policymakers’ attention. 
If climatic projections are correct, some amount of anthropogenic 
warming is almost certainly inevitable.18 The accumulation of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere over the past several decades has ensured some 
degree of warming over the coming century.19  Political leaders have 
considered and debated various emission control policies for decades at the 
national and international level. Yet an enforceable global, emission-control 
regime remains elusive.20 Even if such a regime was put in place, it is 
exceedingly unlikely that it would impose emission controls or other 
measures sufficient to result in a significant reduction of projected 
warming.21 Policymakers must prepare to deal with the consequences of a 
future greenhouse warming today. 
Adaptation to an inevitable warming of the climate and its 
consequent effects must be a key element of any meaningful climate change 
policy. Whereas emission controls and other mitigation measures will not 
                                                                                                                   
human activity was responsible for most of late twentieth century warming, whereas the 2001 
IPCC report concluded that human responsibility was only “likely”). 
17  See id., at 65 (“Over the past 20 years, evidence that humans are affecting the 
climate has accumulated inexorably, and with it has come ever greater certainty across the 
scientific community in the reality of recent climate change and the potential for much greater 
change in the future.”). See also CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15. 
18  See Collins et al., supra note 16, at 71 (noting that some degree of warming is 
unavoidable due to past and present emissions). 
19  Roger Pielke, Jr., et al., Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation, 445 NATURE 597, 597 
(2007) (noting some amount of climate change due to antropogenic emissions is 
“unavoidable”). 
20  See Juliet Eilprin, Climate Change Compromise Plan Offered in Bali, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 15, 2007, at A17. 
21  See Pielke et al., supra note 19, at 597 (“Whatever actions ultimately lead to 
the decarbonization of the global energy system, it will be many decades before they have a 
discernible effect on the climate.”). See also T.M.L. Wigley, The Kyoto Protocol: CO2, CH4 
and Climate Implications, 25 GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS 2285 (1998) (documenting 
the marginal impact on future climate projections of the emission reductions required under 
the Kyoto Protocol). 
Even if dramatic emission reductions and other mitigation measures (such as carbon 
sequestration) could prevent a significant amount of anthropogenic warming over the coming 
decades, it is not clear that such policies would be desirable in comparison to other 
alternatives. If emission reductions do not generate benefits in terms of climate risk reduction 
that are greater than the costs of such reductions and that compare favorably to alternative 
policy measures, such as adaptation to potential climate changes, they may be a poor policy 
investment. 
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produce meaningful results for decades, adaptation has the potential to 
reduce the impacts of climatic warming and increase societal resiliency in the 
near term.22 As former Environmental Protection Agency official G. Tracy 
Mehan notes, “Adaptation offers immediate, tangible, cost-effective, and, 
therefore, politically viable methods of coping with climate change.”23 
Many potential adaptive measures would have the added benefit of 
mitigating existing environmental concerns. In many instances, 
“vulnerability to climate-related impacts on society are increasing for reasons 
that have nothing to do with greenhouse gas emissions, such as rapid 
population growth along coasts and in areas with limited water supplies.”24 
Even if the threat of future warming is reduced, existing demographic 
changes could nonetheless increase the costs of climate change in some 
regions due to its effect on water supplies. Overstretched fresh water 
supplies, like many other potential impacts from climate change, are already 
a concern.25 The marginal effects of climate change are only marginal 
increases on what may already be large costs.26 
 If the precise nature, scope, and timing of global warming over the 
next century remain somewhat uncertain, the consequent effects of such 
warming are even more so. Modeling anticipated changes in the climate due 
to increased contributions of greenhouse gases is immensely difficult, and is 
dependent upon many assumptions of varying reliability.27 Identifying 
specific terrestrial effects from such model results is even more difficult. 
Another source of uncertainty is the “scale mismatch” between existing 
climate models and hydrological models.28  
While there is substantial uncertainty about the details of the impact 
of climate change on water resources, such uncertainty does not extend to the 
likelihood of such changes.29 As the world warms, rising temperatures and 
                                                 
22  Gwyn Prins & Steve Rayner, Time to Ditch Kyoto, 449 NATURE 973, 975 
(2007). 
 Current emissions reductions will mainly benefit future generations, 
whereas the momentum already in the climate system drives the near-
term. Faced with imminent warming, adaptation has a faster response 
time, a closer coupling with innovation and incentive structures, and 
thereby confers more protection more quickly to more people. 
23  G. Tracy Mehan, III, Energy, Climate Change, and Sustainable Water 
Management, DAILY ENVT. REP., Dec. 4, 2007, at 4. Mehan is quick to add the qualification 
that “This is not the same thing as saying it will be easy.” 
24  Pielke, et al., supra note 19, at 597. 
25  See id. at 598. 
26  See id. at 597. 
27  S. Vicuna & J.A. Dracup, The Evolution of Climate Change Impact Studies on 
Hydrology and Water Resources in California, 82 CLIMATIC CHANGE 327, 335 (2007) (stating 
that “[o]ne major limitation to using GCM output data is that the spatial and temporal 
resolution does not match the resolution needed for hydrologic models.”). 
28  CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11 at 196. 
29  See CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 181 (stating that 
“[u]ncertainties in climate change impacts on water resources are mainly due to the 
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changes in precipitation patterns will impact water resources. “The most 
dominant climatic drivers for water availability are precipitation, 
temperature, and evaporative demand,” all of which will be influenced by 
greenhouse warming.30 According to the IPCC’s 2001 report, “Available 
evidence suggests that global warming may lead to substantial changes in 
mean annual streamflows, seasonal distributions of flows, and the 
probabilities of extreme high- or low-flow conditions.”31 
The largest effect climate change will have on water resources is 
likely to result from a shift in the timing, location and amount of 
precipitation.32 Different amounts of rain and snow at different times in 
different places could prove disruptive for many human and ecological 
communities. A projected warming of the climate will also produce changes 
in rates of evaporation, snowmelt, and soil moisture, with consequent effects 
on river flow and groundwater. As the 2007 IPCC report concluded, “A very 
robust finding of hydrological impact studies is that warming leads to 
changes in the seasonality of river flows where much winter precipitation 
currently falls as snow.”33 Even if climate change were not to alter the 
volume of precipitation in a local area, it would still “increase the variance of 
water flows.”34  In short, “The prospect of climate change . . . creates 
considerable uncertainty regarding future water availability.”35  
At the regional scale, the nature and extent of these effects are 
particularly uncertain.36 While climate models are reasonably consistent in 
their temperature projections, there is “greater variability” in their 
precipitation projections.37 Existing climate models do not generate 
consistent projections about “the direction and magnitude of change in 
average annual precipitation” in specific areas.38 According to the IPCC’s 
2001 Working Group II Report, “Changes in precipitation are highly 
uncertain. There is little agreement across climate scenarios regarding 
changes in total annual runoff across North America.”39 Likely changes 
include seasonal shifts in snowmelt and runoff, and a reduction in summer 
                                                                                                                   
uncertainty in precipitation inputs and less due to the uncertainties in greenhouse gas 
emissions, in climate sensitivities, or in hydrological models themselves” (citations omitted)). 
30  Id. at 180. 
31  CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 745 (citations omitted). 
32  CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 180 (“A robust finding is that 
precipitation variability will increase in the future.”). 
33  Id. at 183. 
34  Anthony C. Fisher & Santiago J. Rubio, Adjusting to Climate Change: 
Implications of Increased Variability and Asymmetric Adjustment Costs for Investment in 
Water Reserves, 34 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 207, 208, (1997). 
35  Miller, Rhodes & MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 166. 
36  CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 745 (stating that 
“[h]ydrological cannot yet be forecast reliably at a watershed scale”). 
37  Vicuna & Dracup, supra note 27, at 335. 
38  E. Elgaali, et al., High Resolution Modeling of the Regional Impacts of Climate 
Change on Irrigation Water Demand, 84 CLIMATIC CHANGE 441, 448 (2007). 
39  CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 737. 
736 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:3 
water flows.40 For instance, the IPCC reports “high confidence” in 
predictions that warming “will very likely lead to earlier melting and 
significant reductions in snowpack in the western mountains” of North 
America.41 The 2007 assessment also reported that “[f]reshwater resources 
will be affected by climate change across Canada and the U.S., but the nature 
of the vulnerabilities varies from region to region.”42 A warmer climate will 
also increase “the water-holding capacity of the atmosphere and evaporation 
into the atmosphere,” which is likely to produce greater climate variability.43 
This, in turn, is likely to produce “more intense precipitation and more 
droughts.”44 As one recent review summarized: “Climate change will affect 
not only initial surface runoff into a stream system, but also rates of 
evaporative loss, seepage to groundwater aquifers, recharge from those 
aquifers and rates of consumptive use from irrigation withdrawals along the 
entire stream system.”45 
Some changes have already been observed, though the direct link to 
anthropogenic warming may be difficult to demonstrate. Non-climatic 
drivers of change in water systems remain greater than climate-related 
changes.46 Nonetheless, the IPCC’s 2007 report concluded that “there is 
evidence of a broadly coherent pattern of change in annual runoff” and 
“abundant evidence” of changes in seasonal snow cover and a reduction in 
the timing and volume of resulting runoff in North America.47 It is too early 
to identify the timing and extent of such changes with any precision. At this 
point, however, seasonal changes in runoff are easier to predict than changes 
in annual runoff or the regional distribution of such changes.48 A reduction in 
snow accumulation periods, for example, seems particularly likely.49 As one 
recent study noted, the most significant and predictable impact of a modest 
warming “would be a large reduction in mountain snowpack and a 
commensurate reduction in natural water storage.”50 
Climatic effects on water resources will vary from place to place. 
Recent reviews of river flow trends in the United States have found 
significant trends in almost thirteen percent of river catchments, with as 
                                                 
40  Id. 
41  CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 627. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 176. 
44  Id. 
45  Miller, Rhodes & MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 167. 
46  CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 176. 
47  Id. at 90. 
48  CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 745 (“In general, there is 
greater confidence in projections of seasonal shifts in runoff and related hydrological 
characteristics than there is in projections of changes in annual runoff. Regional patterns of 
precipitation change are highly uncertain.”). 
49  Id. at 745 (“Projections of shorter snow accumulation appear to be more 
robust.”). 
50  Tim Barnett, et al., The Effects of Climate Change on Water Resources in the 
West: Introduction and Overview, 62 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 6 (2004). 
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many experiencing increased river flow as are experiencing decreased river 
flows.51 Some regions will also be more sensitive to climatic changes than 
others. Arid and semi-arid portions of the United States, for example, “will 
be particularly sensitive to any changes in temperature and precipitation,” 
particularly when compared to other regions.52 At present, most climate 
models project a reduction in precipitation in the southwest United States.53 
 Global warming’s effects on water supplies will be compounded by 
changes in water demand for various uses as communities adapt to changing 
temperatures and precipitation patterns.54 For example, warmer, drier 
weather that results in increased evaporation will have an effect on weather-
sensitive water uses.55 Water use for irrigation, for example, is likely to 
increase along with global temperatures, unless temperature increases are 
offset by increases in precipitation.56 This is significant because irrigation is 
responsible for a majority of consumptive water use.57  
Despite the various uncertainties, one conclusion of recent analyses 
is that “even with a conservative climate model, current demands on water 
resources in many parts of the West will not be met under plausible future 
climate conditions, much less the demands of a larger population and a larger 
economy.”58 According to some model estimates, the American West could 
be faced with a thirty to seventy percent decline in snowpack by the latter 
part of the twenty-first century.59 Yet “even if there were no change in the 
variability of precipitation, global warming could be expected to increase the 
variance of water flows,” due to effects on snowpack melt and other 
factors.60 
Significantly, climatic effects on water supplies will occur against a 
background of increasing water scarcity throughout much of the nation, and 
                                                 
51  CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 201, tbl.4-1. 
52  Id. at 745. 
53  Western Water Resources in a Changing Climate: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcomm. on Water and Power 110th Cong. 
(2007) (testimony of Philip W. Mote, Ph.D., Climate Impacts Group, University of 
Washington, Seattle) available at http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/_files/ 
MoteTestimony.pdf. 
54  Noah D. Hall, Bret B. Stuntz, & Robert H. Abrams, Climate Change and 
Freshwater Resources, 22 NAT. RES. & ENV’T (2008) (“The potential for increased demand 
due to higher temperatures comes from all types of water use. Domestic use, especially for 
outdoor purposes (such as yard and garden irrigation) is expected to rise with warming 
temperatures. Industrial use may increase as well. Water is used for cooling on many electrical 
generating systems. An increase in water temperature would decrease the cooling efficiency of 
the water and require more water to be used. Similarly, demand for water will increase to 
compensate for loss of precipitation in many areas.”). 
55  See John J. Boland, Assessing Urban Water Use and the Role of Water 
Conservation Measures Under Climate Uncertainty, 37 CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 157 (1997). 
56  CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 179. 
57  Id.  
58  Barnett et al., supra note 50, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
59  Gertner, supra note 8, at 70. 
60  Fisher & Rubio, supra note 34, at 208. 
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particularly in the west where urban growth is fueling dramatic increases in 
water demand.61 Domestic water use in western states more than doubled 
from 1960 to 1990, from 6.5 million acre-feet to 14 million acre-feet, and 
continues to climb.62 Per capita water consumption increased throughout the 
twenty-first century, despite increased awareness of pressures on water 
supplies.63 As populations continue to grow in western states, demand for 
water will only increase. Further, demand for instream flows and other water 
uses is also increasing, while traditional means of augmenting water supply 
through dams, reservoirs, and the like have reached their limits. Without 
substantial reforms, existing water institutions will have difficulty meeting 
existing demands on water resources, let alone the increased demands 
brought about by climate change. 
 
III. THE POWER OF WATER MARKETS 
 
 Climate change presents a dilemma for water management. The 
gradual warming of the atmosphere is certain to change the distribution and 
availability of water supplies. Yet the precise nature, magnitude, timing, and 
distribution of such changes are unknown. This uncertainty complicates the 
task of water managers who are already faced with escalating demands. “It is 
no longer appropriate to assume that past hydrological conditions will 
continue into the future (the traditional assumption) and, due to climate 
change uncertainty, managers can no longer have confidence in single 
projections of the future.”64 One way to manage “the uncertainty associated 
with estimates of future climate change is to adopt management measures 
that are robust to uncertainty.”65 
 The climate challenge requires the creation of institutional 
arrangements that can foster greater resilience and adaptability in water 
management. As the IPCC has observed, “The institutions that govern water 
allocation will play a large role in determining the overall social impacts of a 
change in water availability, as well as the distribution of gains and losses 
across different sectors of society.”66 Existing water management institutions 
are already pressed to their limits. There is little question that “current water 
law and policy are not up to the new challenges of climate change and 
                                                 
61  A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Can de Wetering, Western Growth and Sustainable 
Water Use: If There Are No “Natural Limits” Should We Worry about Water Supplies?, 27 
PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 33, 38 (2006) (noting the “projected gap” between urban 
water demands and existing water supplies). 
62  Nicole L. Johnson, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 205, 206 
(2007). 
63  See Indur M. Goklany, Comparing 20th-Century Trends in U.S. and Global 
Agricultural Water and Land Use, in THE WATER REVOLUTION: PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO 
WATER SCARCITY 25 (Kendra Okonski ed. 2006). 
64  CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 199. 
65  Id. at 200. 
66  Id. at 191. 
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resulting pressures on freshwater resources.”67 Indeed, “even with a 
conservative climate model, current demands on water resources in many 
parts of the West will not be met under plausible future climate conditions, 
much less the demands of a larger population and a larger economy.”68  
Effective institutions must be robust enough to accommodate changes in 
water availability by facilitating reallocation of water supplies, while 
encouraging cost-effective conservation measures and efficiency 
enhancements and remaining sufficiently flexible and adaptable to account 
for the uncertain climate forecast.   
  The demands of current and projected water management challenges 
can best be met through a greater reliance on water markets for water 
management. As Professor Thompson concludes, “As competing demands 
for our limited water supplies grow, and as the possibility of global warming 
threatens to increase our water supplies’ year-to-year variability, the need for 
robust water markets will increase.”69 Specifically, water management must 
shift toward recognition of transferable rights in water that facilitate 
voluntary exchanges and the market pricing of water resources. While such 
reforms may be difficult, and there are no panaceas for the water 
management challenges faced by the western United States, greater use of 
water markets offers the best opportunity to adapt to climate change and its 
impacts on water supplies. Even the IPCC acknowledges that “improving the 
functioning of water markets could help create the kind of flexibility needed 
to respond to uncertain changes in future water availability.”70 
 Markets are powerful institutions for resource allocation. They 
facilitate the allocation of resources to their highest value use through 
voluntary exchange and the generation of information about relative scarcity 
and demand. “The invisible hand of the marketplace is demonstrably far 
more efficient in the allocation of scarce resources, in the sense of 
maximizing net social welfare, than the invisible hand of politics.” 71 Unlike 
administrative allocation methods, water markets provide for the 
compensation of those who “lose” from the transfer of water resources. 
Markets take advantage of localized and dispersed information about 
resource supplies and demands, including subjective valuations and 
individualized uses for different resources in different places. Such 
information is virtually impossible to centralize in an administrative agency. 
Markets allow for the reallocation of risk to those who are best able to bear 
the risk of uncertainty.  
                                                 
67  Hall, Stuntz, & Abrams, supra note 54. 
68  Barnett, et al., supra note 50, at 6. 
69  Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Markets and The Problem of Shifting 
Paradigms, in WATER MARKETING – THE NEXT GENERATION 1, 24 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter 
J. Hill eds., 1997). 
70  CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WGII, supra note 11, at 748. 
71  See Huffman, supra note 1, at 432. 
740 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:3 
While it should be reiterated that markets are not perfect – no human 
institutions are without flaws – markets provide a superior institutional 
framework for addressing the water management problems global climate 
change will create. Markets are essential for the efficient allocation and 
distribution of many physical resources. While water marketing presents 
some challenges, they are not insuperable. Indeed, “the efficacy of markets 
for averting resource shortages is no better demonstrated than with water.”72  
 
A. Market Foundations 
 
 Water markets have been used in many parts of the world for the 
allocation and distribution of rights in water.73 In the United States, for 
instance, water markets emerged in many western states as an outgrowth of 
the prior appropriation doctrine, which recognized property rights in water.74 
These rights are usufructary rights – that is rights to use water, rather than 
rights to the water itself. “Water rights are usufructary not because water is 
special or because the public has a particular interest in water but because the 
physical nature of water is unique.”75 This may make water markets “more 
complex than markets for other resources,” and may increase transaction 
costs for water transfers.76 Nonetheless, water rights can be widely 
transferable, almost like most any other marketplace good.77 However 
limited existing water rights in the U.S. may be, the overall volume of water 
transfers is quite substantial and is increasing over time.78 “Efficiency gains 
from tradable water rights appear to be significant.”79 Indeed, by some 
estimates, the net welfare gains from water markets exceed the value of the 
water rights themselves.80 
                                                 
72  Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Introduction: Taking the Plunge, in WATER 
MARKETING – THE NEXT GENERATION xi, xi (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997). 
73  For a summary, see Paul Holden & Mateen Thobani, Tradable Water Rights: A 
Property Rights Approach to Resolving Water Shortages and Promoting Investment (World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1627, July 1996), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1996/07/01/000009265_39
61214131318/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. 
74  See Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water Law 
for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REV. 861 (2001) 
(tracing the development of water rights under the common law). 
75  Huffman, supra note 1, at 439. 
76  See Jedidiah Brewer et al., Water Markets in the West: Prices, Trading and 
Contractual Forms, Arizona Legal Studies Disc. Paper No. 07-07 (Feb. 2007), at 3. 
77  In most U.S. jurisdictions, there are regulatory, administrative or other legal 
restraints on water rights, such as requirements that diversions of surface water be in the 
“public interest.” See Jedidiah Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987-
2005, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021, 1026 (2007). 
78  See Brewer et al., supra note 77, at 1042; Brewer et al., supra note 76, at 3. 
79  Marian L. Weber, Markets for Water Rights Under Environmental Constraints, 
42 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 53, (2001). 
80  Andrew Morriss, Real People, Real Resources, and Real Choices: The Case 
for Market Valuation of Water, TEX. TECH L. REV. 973, 982 (2006). 
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To be most effective, water rights must be well-defined, enforceable, 
and transferable.81 The precise contours and content of the rights can vary, 
however. Water rights can be defined in terms of actual water volume, a 
share of a given water body or water flow, or in terms of the availability of 
water of a particular quantity at a given place.82 Water rights can also be 
consumptive or non-consumptive, and may or may not be held subject to the 
rights of third parties or other water right holders.  
 Water markets do not only consist of outright sales of water rights. 
As water markets evolve over time, potential buyers and sellers develop 
contracts and instruments to address specific demands and needs. While 
outright transfers of water rights occur, so do various short-term and long-
term leases, “sale-leasebacks,”83 and option contracts. Where state law 
authorizes the purchase or lease of instream water flows, conservation 
organizations have negotiated innovative deals with water rights owners in 
order to enhance the habitat value of rivers and streams.84 As the IPCC 
observed, “Where feasible, short-term transfers can provide flexibility and 
increased security for highly valued water uses such as urban supply, and in 
some circumstances may prove more beneficial than constructing additional 
storage reservoirs.”85 
 As with property rights in any other saleable good or commodity, 
water rights are the foundation for water markets and can provide substantial 
incentives for increased efficiency and allocation of rights to their highest 
valued use. “Waste generally rears its ugly head where a transfer of resources 
is not permitted.”86 Where an individual is using a transferable resource in an 
inefficient or wasteful manner, there is an opportunity for an entrepreneur to 
gain from acquiring the resource and putting it to better use. Where rights to 
water are transferable, water prices will reflect the value of alternative uses. 
This gives the rights holder an incentive to allocate the water to its highest 
                                                 
81  ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 23; see also Brewer et al., supra note 
77, at 1024 (“Most economists agree that an efficient system of property rights requires three 
elements: a complete definition; exclusivity; and transferability.”); RICHARD L. STROUP, ECO-
NOMICS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 18-20 
(2003). 
82  See Holden & Thobani, supra note 73, at 2. 
83  As described by Anderson and Snyder, a “sale-leaseback” involves “purchase 
of land and water rights followed by lease of the land and water rights back to the sellers.” 
ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 103-04. Such contracts can be used to keep agricultural 
land in production after the sale of land and adjoining water rights. 
84  See Janet C. Neuman, The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly: The First Ten Years 
of the Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. REV. 432, 440 (2004) (“The Trust has developed a 
number of innovative market devices that go beyond outright water rights purchases to create 
transactions that work in varying circumstances with diverse water users.”). 
85  CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 198. 
86  Andrew Morriss et al., Principles for Water, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 335, 343 
(2002). 
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valued use.87 Transferability also creates substantial incentives for 
conservation, particularly insofar as rights holders can sell the water they 
conserve to other users.88 Such incentives can be quite powerful, particularly 
given the wide disparity between the prices agricultural users and others pay 
for water in the United States.  
Many agricultural users pay little for the water they use, sometimes 
nothing more than the cost of pumping the water from a federal irrigation 
project to the land where the water will be used.89 The U.S. government has 
subsidized agricultural water use for decades, encouraging profligate and 
wasteful water use in irrigation. Combined with the fact that property rights 
in land have been more well-defined and defended than rights in water, 
farmers have more incentive to improve the efficiency of land use than to 
focus on efficient water use, and to use water or irrigated land as a substitute 
for dry land in the production of crops.90 Between 1910 and 2000, the 
amount of crop land in the United States declined by three percent, despite 
increased food demand, due to increases in per acre productivity.91 At the 
same time, water withdrawals for irrigation increased 251 percent and the 
amount of irrigated land increased by over 350 percent.92 In short, this period 
saw dramatic increases in agricultural land-use productivity, while water-use 
productivity stagnated.93 
Simply allowing farmers to sell their water rights to “thirsty cities” 
would provide substantial incentives to increase water use efficiency in the 
agricultural sector.94 The result is a win-win situation: the farmer receives 
payment for giving up water rights that he no longer needs and the “thirsty 
city” gets water that it would otherwise not have (or need to pay even more 
to obtain). The possibility of a voluntary transaction increases efficiency and 
produces gains for buyer and seller alike. The potential for such transfers is 
quite large: “It is estimated that 80 percent of consumptive use (CU) of water 
in the arid west of the United States is from agriculture, and irrigated land 
increased from 3.5 million acres in 1950 to 15 million acres in 1990 . . . .”95 
Further, “[i]n the western USA, water-market transactions and other 
                                                 
87  See Holden & Thobani, supra note 73, at 11 (“Tradable water rights allow the 
price of water to reflect the value of its alternative uses, which creates incentives to put it to 
the most productive use.”). 
88  Morriss, et al., supra note 86, at 336 (“Water markets create incentives for 
conservation by offering water rights holders the potential to sell the water they conserve.”). 
89  Jedidiah Brewer, Robert Glennon, Alan Ker, & Gary Libecap, Water Markets 
in the West: Prices, Trading and Contractual Forms (Feb. 2007) (unpublished discussion 
paper, filed as no. 07-07 with the Arizona Legal Studies Department). 
90  Indur M. Goklany, Comparing 20th Century Trends in U.S. and Global 
Agricultural Water and Land Use, 27 WATER INTL. 321 (2002), available at 
http://members.cox.net/igoklany/Water%20International%202002.pdf. 
91  Id. at 321-22. 
92  Id. at 322. 
93  Id. at 325-26. 
94  Brewer, et al., supra note 77, at 1022-23. 
95  Elgaali et al., supra note 38, at 442. 
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negotiated transfers of water from agricultural to urban or environmental 
uses are increasingly being used to accommodate long-term changes in 
demand (e.g. due to population growth) as well as short-term needs arising 
from drought emergencies.”96 This would provide significant benefits in the 
context of climate change. As the IPCC itself has noted: 
If water supplies decline in particular locations or seasons, 
water markets could soften the impacts by moving water 
from lower to higher valued uses. In the western United 
States, where irrigation now accounts for more than 80% of 
consumptive water use, water market activity is likely to 
continue the current trend of movement of water out of 
irrigated agriculture to accommodate other water uses.97 
With water markets, buyers and sellers of water rights get to 
determine what water is worth to them, and make decisions about whether to 
engage in voluntary transfers accordingly. Where transfers occur, it is 
because a buyer values the water more than the seller. Thus, water transfers 
reallocate water rights from lower value uses to higher value uses, producing 
a more efficient allocation of the resource. Insofar as some users, or would-
be water users, hold particularly idiosyncratic value preferences, these are 
also incorporated into the price, as water rights are only transferred when 
both buyer and seller agree.  
 
B. Prices and Information 
 
Prices are an essential component of working markets.98 Price 
signals and the potential to profit from differences in valuation provide 
powerful incentives for innovation. Those who uncover ways to facilitate 
trades or increase efficiency can profit from such discoveries. Price signals 
provide powerful incentives for conservation while simultaneously 
communicating information about collective judgments about the relative 
scarcity of resources across time and space.  
Prices enable markets to operate as a powerful coordination 
mechanism. Prices communicate information about the relative scarcity of 
goods and services in various places, and the valuation placed upon the good 
for current and alternative uses.99 As market conditions fluctuate, market 
prices change accordingly. As environmental economist Richard Stroup 
explains, “market prices adjust constantly to all of the supply and demand 
variables, providing each buyer and each seller with up-to-date information 
                                                 
96  CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WGII, supra note 15, at 198. 
97  Id. at 748. 
98  See generally STROUP, supra note 81, at 27-29. 
99  Morriss, supra note 80, at 979 (“When we observe a market price, we have a 
remarkably compact source of fairly dense information.”). 
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on changes in relative values in the world around them.”100 This function is 
performed in a hyper-efficient manner, particularly in comparison to 
administrative mechanisms that seek to measure relative scarcity, and 
enables market participants to take account of changing market conditions 
without specific knowledge about such conditions. Such information is 
communicated in the market price. 
 Through the price system, markets incorporate and account for far 
more information than centralized administrative entities, and at far less 
cost.101 This is important because information is both extremely valuable, 
and quite costly to uncover and accumulate.102 “By conveying the alternative 
valuations of resources, prices enable market actors to compare their present 
use of a resource to the potential use others might make of it without 
knowing the details of those potential uses.”103 Accumulating and processing 
the same volume of information through an administrative process would be 
exceedingly costly, and would be difficult (if not impossible) to achieve in as 
timely a fashion. 
A regulatory system that seeks to limit the amount of water used for 
various purposes to “appropriate” amounts would require the collection and 
consideration of myriad amounts of information concerning the relevant 
information about how water is and could be used within various industries 
in different places and at different times. Such efforts rarely succeed as 
planned because centralized decision-makers are not able to collect and 
process a sufficient volume of information.104 An adaptive system, such as is 
required to respond adequately to the threat of climate change, is even more 
information intensive.105 A market system, in which users pay for the 
resource that they use, enables individual water users to weigh the trade-off 
between the cost of obtaining additional water, the cost of reducing or 
conserving water use, and other relevant factors. Such decentralized 
approaches may sacrifice the potential for “expert” centralized water 
management, but they make greater use of specialized knowledge about 
individual circumstances and preferences.106 As Professor Andrew Morriss 
                                                 
100  STROUP, supra note 81, at 27; see also Morriss, supra note 80, at 988 (“Market 
prices respond to events quickly, sending market participants signals about the impact of 
events on the goods and services sold in markets.”). 
101  Morriss et al., supra note 86, at 358 (“The information requirements for 
markets are significantly lower than for administrative allocations because markets are able to 
rely upon price signals.”). 
102  See STROUP, supra note 81, at 11-12; Morriss et al., supra note 86, at 337 
(“Information is costly to acquire and to process. All else equal, therefore, a solution that 
requires more information is more costly than one that requires less.”). 
103  Morriss, et al., supra note 86, at 358. 
104  This is the insight of Nobel Laureate economist Friedrich Hayek. See, e.g., F. 
A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
105  Denise Lach, Helen Ingram, & Steve Rayner, Maintaining the Status Quo: 
How Institutional Norms and Practices Create Conservative Water Organizations, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 2027, 2048-2049 (2005). 
106  See generally, Morriss, supra note 86, at 338. 
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observes, “it is markets’ connection with real choices, made by real people 
with real consequences for the people making the choices that enables 
markets to value resources, including water, in a fashion that leads to better 
outcomes than the alternatives.”107 
When unforeseen events alter resource supply and demand, prices 
quickly shift to account for the relevant changes. In this fashion, market 
institutions “encourage individuals to adapt to changed circumstances.”108 
Markets also quickly incorporate – and market prices reflect – changing 
values and increased knowledge about a particular resource. If a new 
technology increases or decreases demand for the resource in question, prices 
will respond as individual buyers and sellers begin to take account of this 
new development.  
 
C. Prices and Efficiency 
 
 Another reason to rely upon market pricing for water is that it will 
encourage consumers to use water more efficiently. The use of price 
mechanisms, such as drought demand rates, can “enhance the efficiency of 
water resource allocation among customers.”109 Price-related measures that 
can encourage greater conservation include excess surcharges, drought 
demand rates, variable seasonal rates and time of use rates.110  
While potentially more effective than other demand control 
measures, use of market prices is not always politically popular, and political 
authorities are often responsible for making retail-level water pricing 
decisions.111 Water is heavily subsidized throughout the United States, 
particularly in the agricultural sector, which accounts for the vast majority of 
western water use. As a general matter, water prices are below prices that 
would prevail in competitive markets.112 As Professor Glennon laments, “the 
price of water in the United States is ridiculously low.”113 In some cities, 
there is little charge for water, and water use is not even measured.114 Even 
                                                 
107  Morriss, supra note 80, at 974. 
108  Id. at 988. 
109  Williams James Smith, Jr. & Young-Doo Wang, Conservation Rates: The Best 
‘New’ Source of Urban Water During Drought, WATER & ENV’T J. (2007) (OnlineEarly 
Articles), at 9. 
110  Id. at 2. 
111  Mehan, supra note 5, at 2 (“Full-cost pricing is a hard goal to obtain given that 
most of America’s water and wastewater utilities are publicly owned; and any decision on 
water rates is, of necessity, a political decision – often a controversial one.”). 
112  Sheila M. Olmstead, W. Michael Hanemann, & Robert N. Stavins, Water 
Demand Under Alternative Price Structures, 54 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 181, 183 (2007) 
(“Water prices in North America generally lie below the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) of 
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where water is metered, only rarely do consumers pay for the actual costs of 
the water they use, largely due to political pressures.115 
Given that most consumers pay artificially low water prices, few 
have much incentive to economize on their water use. Profligate water use is 
a predictable response to artificially low water rates – rates that are 
effectively subsidized by government management or political interventions 
in the marketplace. As economists Anderson and Snyder explain, “[w]hat is 
seen as waste or inefficient water use in rural or urban areas is simply the 
users’ rational response to low water prices.”116 This is the direct result of 
longstanding government policy: “Water prices have been kept artificially 
low, and the inevitable shortages have followed. Governments have 
responded by attempting to restrain demand, ration water, and increase the 
available supply.”117 
It is often assumed that residential water demand is “relatively price 
inelastic,” and therefore price changes will not produce dramatic changes in 
water use patterns.118 This position is maintained by many water policy 
experts and administrators.119 Yet experience shows that many water users 
will reduce water consumption when faced with higher prices. The 
responsiveness of different water users, at different times and places, will 
vary, but users will respond.120 “If the price of water rose, people would 
carefully examine how they use water, for what purposes, and in what 
quantity.”121 Further, if water users are able to transfer their water rights to 
others, they may respond to higher prices by selling their water to those with 
higher value water uses.  
Empirical evidence finds that “both sides of the market exhibit 
surprising price responsiveness or elasticity.”122 Faced with higher prices, 
consumers will prioritize and economize their water use.123 Different 
                                                 
115  Olmstead et al., supra note 112 (“Water prices are usually set by elected or 
appointed entities, such as city councils or, for the relatively small number of investor-owned 
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116  ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 10. 
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118  Mary E. Renwick & Richard D. Green, Do Residential Water Demand Side 
Management Policies Measure Up? An Analysis of Eight California Water Agencies, 40 J. 
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 37, 37 (2000). 
119  Olmstead et al., supra note 112, at 181 (“Water managers traditionally have 
maintained that consumers do not respond to price signals, so demand management has 
occurred most frequently through restrictions on specific water uses and requirements for the 
adoption of specific technologies.”) 
120  ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 8. 
121  Glennon, supra note 6, at 1883. 
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residential consumers will respond differently to changes in water prices, 
however.124 According to one study: “Aggregate single family household 
demand was responsive to price changes. However price responsiveness 
varied seasonally. In particular, aggregate demand was 25% more price 
responsive in the summer months, reflecting the more discretionary nature of 
outdoor water use.”125 
Increased efficiency can have a dramatic effect on water use 
patterns. Water use can vary significantly by locality, even within regions. 
For example, the average resident of Los Angeles uses approximately 125 
gallons of water per day, whereas the average resident of Tucson only uses 
114 gallons.126 Surprisingly enough, the United States, as a whole, uses less 
water today than it did 25 years ago, according to Peter Gleick of the Pacific 
Institute. 127 
Water usage rates vary substantially within individual industries.128 
In the residential sector, strikingly different water use patterns emerge based 
on how water is priced. Professor Glennon reports that per capita water use is 
approximately 300 gallons per day in Fresno, California, where water use is 
not metered.129 In the neighboring community of Clovis, however, water is 
metered, and per capita water use is thirty three percent lower.130 In the 
1970s, price increases and other measures reduced the average peak daily 
water demand by approximately 20 percent.131 
In agriculture, where the potential for water use savings may be 
greatest, price increases create incentives for producers to “substitute labor 
and capital for water,” and use more efficient, and less water-intensive, 
irrigation techniques.132 Forced to pay the market value of water, many 
agricultural users may sell their water to other users who can better afford its 
higher cost. These agricultural users would also find conservation measures 
to be better investments than before, particularly if they could sell any 
conserved water.133 “Rate increases would encourage the elimination of 
marginal economic activities and the movement of water toward more 
productive uses,” and encourage technological innovation as well.134 
Allowing water prices to fluctuate with changes in supply and 
demand would likely force many consumers to pay significantly more for 
water, particularly in areas where water is heavily subsidized. As a 
                                                 
124  Smith & Wang, supra note 109, at 7. 
125  Renwick & Green, supra note 118, at 51. 
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130  Id. 
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consequence, some are concerned that price mechanisms are regressive. Yet 
given the choice between price mechanisms, rationing, and mandatory 
restrictions, pricing is the “most timely and equitable approach” to managing 
drought-induced supply shortfalls.135 
“An underappreciated but significant advantage” of price 
mechanisms is their “positive environmental impact.”136 “The reduction in 
the consumption of water allows for an increased amount of water to remain 
in the natural environment, thus buoying ecological systems and 
multistakeholder user rights in a manner championed in integrated water 
resources management literature.”137 Even rather modest reforms, such as the 
implementation of drought demand surcharges can “make an immediate and 
powerful short-term positive impact both in terms of supply and ecology.”138 
Public water authorities are reluctant to subject consumers to higher 
prices, even during drought conditions. Increasing water rates imposes 
visible costs on their constituents, and risks political unpopularity. Public 
officials would rather impose moratoria on “wasteful” water uses than 
subject water use to the discipline of price changes that reflect market 
conditions.139 This is a particularly inefficient way to manage water 
consumption because it ignores the heterogeneity of consumer preferences 
and the marginal benefits arising from different users who alter their 
consumption in different ways.140 “Under-pricing water and restricting its use 
by law and tradition result in inefficient use, lost development opportunities, 
interruptions in service, and higher costs for new users.”141 
Where price is used instead of a command-and-control use 
restriction, individual users can alter their water use so as to ensure that they 
are maximizing their utility. If there is a concern that temporary price 
increases resulting from drought conditions are regressive, this could be 
addressed through targeted, means-tested subsidies for those in need without 
sacrificing the underlying benefits of a reliance upon price signals to 
encourage more efficient use.142 
Some further oppose the use of prices to manage water supplies 
because water is viewed as a necessity, or even a right, rather than an 
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economic good.143 Yet as Professor Huffman observes, it is precisely water’s 
“specialness,” and resulting scarcity, that requires its allocation through 
institutions that maximize efficiency; for “it is abundantly clear that no social 
institution yet conceived will yield greater net social welfare from a scarce 
resource than a well-functioning market.”144  
 
D. Accounting for Uncertainty 
 
 One of the greatest challenges posed by climate change is the 
uncertainty it magnifies, if not creates. The precise scope, timing and 
location of its effect on water supplies are uncertain. The range of potential 
effects in any given place is quite large. Traditional planning tools are poorly 
equipped to address climatic effects on water supplies. “Even under the 
presumption of a stable climate, imprecise hydrologic information is now 
frequently at the heart of costly conflicts over proposed water transfers and 
new water developments.”145 As Kenneth Frederick of Resources for the 
Future explains, “to plan for and justify expensive new projects when the 
magnitude, timing, and even the direction of the changes are unknown . . . 
Building for changes that never materialize or failing to build facilities to 
deal with changes that do occur are both potentially costly.”146 Those 
administrative agencies tasked with water management have been quite timid 
in modernizing or reforming their management strategies to account for 
current and projected stresses on water supplies, and have done little to 
prepare for the threat of climate change.147 As the IPCC further concluded, 
“water planners need to recognize that it is not possible to resolve all 
uncertainties, so it would not be wise to base decisions on only one, or a few, 
climate model scenarios. Rather, making use of probabilistic assessments of 
future hydrological changes may allow planners to better evaluate risks and 
response options.”148 Such uncertainty also highlights the need for flexible 
and adaptive water management institutions. 
Water markets can both reduce uncertainty for water users and 
provide security against the harms that uncertainty can produce.149 If water 
users are able to purchase additional water rights from other users, this can 
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reduce the impact of droughts and other local or temporal supply 
disruptions.150 While all water users in a given region may suffer from 
drought conditions, the costs to some water users may be greater than others. 
Transferable water rights enable water users to shift these costs to those who 
are best able to bear them, thereby reducing the overall costs of such 
unforeseen supply disruptions.151 The availability to transfer water also 
reduces “the cost of sudden reductions in water supply resulting from 
droughts . . . by permitting reallocation of the remaining water to its highest 
uses.”152  
Such flexibility is an important virtue of water markets. 
While certainty of supply remains a dominant concern for 
water users in the western states, flexibility to move water 
from one type of use to another has become increasingly 
valuable. The value of flexibility is reflected in the 
increasing numbers of market transfers of water rights 
throughout the region and in efforts to devise new 
mechanisms to facilitate short-term transfers of water 
entitlements.153 
Flexibility helps water users accommodate potential risks to water supplies, 
and is quite valuable as a result. 
The ability to transfer water rights in advance of potential supply 
changes also enables water users to reallocate the risk of uncertainty.154 
Water users can acquire options that will enable them to obtain water 
necessary to address unanticipated changes in future supply. As in 
commodity markets, such options are an important risk management 
instrument. This “ability of markets to ‘shift’ uncertainty is important both 
because the law might mistakenly misallocate the burden of uncertainty and 
because the government cannot always determine who can best bear the 
burden” of uncertainty or unanticipated losses.155 As compared to 
administrative allocations, markets are a far superior, and far more flexible 
and adaptable, means of accommodating uncertainty. As Professor Morriss 
explains: 
Water use, even if optimized today, must change tomorrow 
to remain optimal. A planned solution is thus unable to 
remain optimal without continual readjustment. Market 
solutions, on the other hand, allow for continuous 
adjustment without central intervention. Reaching a planned 
optimum requires a great deal of information to be available 
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to the planner. Markets, by contrast, allow decentralized 
processing of information.156 
 
IV. THE MOVE TO MARKETS 
 
It may well be that the most efficient systems of water markets 
evolve over time and cannot simply be imposed from above by government 
fiat.157 Yet there are still several steps government agencies can take to 
facilitate the development of water markets and greater reliance upon market 
institutions in the allocation and management of water resources. The steps 
include 1) defining, and recognizing the security and transferability of 
property rights in water resources; 2) eliminating government subsidies for 
water use and distribution; 3) moving toward market-based prices for water; 
and 4) identifying and reducing legal and regulatory barriers to water 
transfers, particularly interbasin and interstate water transfers.158 
Existing obstacles to water markets include regulatory barriers, 
“inconsistent legal paradigms, opposition by government agencies that 
control much of the water and key transportation facilities, and to a growing 
extent, concerns about the impact of transfers on exporting communities.”159 
State rules that limit the lease and sale of water unduly obstruct the 
development of efficient water markets.160 Many regulatory jurisdictions 
deliberately inhibit water transfers outside of their jurisdiction.161 The threat 
of administrative expropriation can also discourage private investments that 
would facilitate water transfers.162 Overall, the more governmental agencies 
are involved in water distribution and allocation, the greater the obstacles to 
water markets.163 
 The single most important step administrative agencies and law-
making bodies can take is to recognize and protect water rights so as to 
provide the institutional foundation upon which water markets may be built 
or evolve. As Professor Thompson observes, “By providing the legal 
infrastructure for water markets and actively encouraging such markets, the 
government can help reduce the harm from uncertainty in water rights and 
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deliveries.”164 The unfortunate reality is that “the way to water marketing has 
been strewn with the obstacles of a legal regime designed to secure water, 
often with the benefit of taxpayer subsidies, to politically influential water 
users.”165 Therefore, “because of water law’s historic hostility toward 
markets, water markets need all of the government affirmation and support 
they can get.”166 
According to Professor Howe, the most important legal change to 
encourage greater efficiency in water use is “salvage legislation” that ensures 
that those who manage to reduce their consumptive use of water do not 
suffer reductions in their water rights as a result.167 In many states, farmers 
and other rights owners operate under a “use it or lose it” regime that only 
recognizes the validity of water rights for certain uses recognized as 
“beneficial.”168 A consequence of such rules is that there is little incentive to 
improve water use efficiency.169 Under “salvage legislation,” however, those 
who conserve water would acquire a valuable commodity: a transferable 
water right that could be sold or put to other uses.  
Legal and administrative barriers are not the only obstacles to greater 
water marketing. In some cases, water transfers are simply too costly to 
complete due to transportation or other transaction costs. Where there are no 
legal or institutional barriers to such trades, however, the potential for a 
wealth-maximizing trade creates incentives for would-be entrepreneurs to 
uncover ways of lowering such transaction costs so as to make a deal. This 
does not mean other concerns should be ignored. Special accommodations 
may have to be made for water markets to adequately take account of 
instream flows and sensitive biological resources.170 But such 
accommodations should be made in the context of water markets, and such 
concerns should not be an excuse to forestall market reforms. Indeed, water 
markets have substantial environmental benefits, including increasing 
opportunities for conservation organizations to directly influence water 
allocation decisions as market participants.171 In many places, 
“environmental interests have actively supported improved transferability of 
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water rights, because they see market transfers as an environmentally less 
damaging alternative to new dams.”172 
While much ink is spilled over concerns that allowing water 
transfers could harm those communities from which water is transferred, 
water markets provide a more equitable means of water transfer than the 
administrative alternatives.173 In water markets, water is transferred as a 
result of voluntary transactions between a willing buyer and a willing seller. 
Those who had rights to water are compensated for giving up their rights. 
While there still may be third parties who suffer indirect effects from the 
water transfer, this is true under any water transfer scenario. Only in the 
absence of water markets are such losses compounded by the public harms 
resulting from inefficient water allocation and waste.  
 One transitional measure that has shown much promise is the 
implementation of water banks to facilitate regional transfers. A water bank 
essentially operates as a clearinghouse to facilitate the rental of surplus water 
where it is needed. Among the benefits of water banks is that they can reduce 
the transaction costs associated with contracting for water transfers.174 
Further, transfers conducted through water banks “clash less with the public 
resource paradigm” and existing regulatory institutions than do pure, open-
market transfers of water.175 California has had positive experiences with the 
use of water banks. In the 1970s, a temporary federal water bank helped 
alleviate drought impacts.176 In the 1990s, the California Department of 
Water Resources created water banks that efficiently reallocated large 
volumes of water among both public and private users.177 Water banks have 
been used in Idaho as well.178 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Climate change presents many challenges, but it also presents 
opportunities. In the case of water, the need to prepare for the impact of 
climatic warming creates an opportunity to improve on existing institutions. 
In particular, the threat of climate change could provide the long-needed 
impetus to shift away from centralized political management of water 
resources, toward market-based institutions. Such a shift holds the potential 
to increase the efficiency and environmental soundness of water use in the 
United States.  
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Climate change is ultimately a problem about environmental risk, 
albeit a very large risk. Risk management polices can be viewed as various 
types of insurance. The purpose of such policies is to reduce the risk up 
front, provide compensation in the event of loss, or to otherwise reduce the 
likelihood or magnitude of future losses. To be worthwhile, however, the 
cost of insurance premiums must be justified by the degree of risk reduction 
or protection that is acquired. Given the relatively high costs of emission 
controls at present, the technological obstacles to wide-scale carbon 
sequestration, and the comparatively low cost of some adaptation measures, 
the ideal form of insurance for climate change will consist of a combination 
of mitigation and adaptation measures. In the case of water, the development 
of market institutions is a particularly apt form of adaptation. 
Water markets are not a panacea. As the IPCC concluded, “although 
well-functioning water markets may ameliorate socioeconomic impacts of 
reduced water availability, they cannot completely eliminate the adverse 
impacts of a drying scenario.”179 In practice, “[t]he effectiveness of water 
marketing in promoting flexible adaptation to prospective climate change 
will depend on the nature of the markets.” 180 Despite these limitations, water 
markets should play a central role in efforts to mitigate the potential harms of 
climate change within the water sector.  
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